We apply a structural model of mothers' labor supply and child care choices to evaluate the effects of two childcare reforms in Germany that were introduced simultaneously in August 2013. First, a legal claim to subsidized child care became effective for all children aged one year or older. Second, a new benefit called 'Betreuungsgeld' came into effect that is granted to families who do not use public or publicly subsidized child care. Both reforms target children of the same age group and are unconditional on the parents' income or employment status, yet affect mothers' incentives for labor supply and child care choices in opposite directions. Our model facilitates estimating the joint reform impact as well as disentangling the individual effects of both policies. A comprehensive data set with information on labor supply, the use of and potential access restrictions to various child care arrangements provides the basis for the empirical analysis. We find the overall effect of both reforms to be small but positive as far as mother's labor supply and the use of formal care is concerned. The legal claim's positive impact on mothers' labor supply and the use of formal child care is largely offset by the negative effect on both outcomes resulting from the introduction of the 'Betreuungsgeld'.
Introduction
Germany has long ranked low on indicators such as fertility, mothers' labor force participation, and the well-being of children. Since the middle of the 2000s policy makers have introduced a number of family policy reforms aimed at reducing the relatively long work interruptions of mothers, increasing the number of children in formal care, and raising fertility (Ristau, 2005) .
The expansion of public child care is a major building block of the reforms. child has a legal claim to a slot in a publicly subsidized child care institution after the first birthday. 3 The increase in child care availability improves the incentives for mothers to return to work in the first three years after giving birth.
In August 2013, at the same time as the legal claim to child care was introduced and motivated by distributive goals, a new benefit -the 'Betreuungsgeld' -came into effect. It is paid to parents with children aged 15-36 months who are not using publicly subsidized child care. The idea is that these families should also benefit from care subsidies in the form of direct cash transfers. The incentives of this benefit counteract the positive work stimulus created by the legal claim to a child care slot. The 'Betreuungsgeld' has been criticized for discouraging mothers to return to work and for providing negative incentives for children to attend formal child care. It has been argued that children from disadvantaged socio-economic family backgrounds would particularly be deterred from child care institutions, although it is presumed that this group could benefit most from attending these institutions already at an early age.
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In this paper we assess the effects that the two policies introduced on August 1 st 2013
have on mothers' employment and the use of formal child care. Both, the legal claim to child care and the new 'Betreuungsgeld' are targeted at families with children in their second and third year of life. Theoretically, we expect the two policies to have effects in opposite directions: The legal claim to child care should increase mothers' labor supply and the use of formal child care.
On the contrary, we expect the 'Betreuungsgeld' to diminish the utilization of formal child care
and -depending on the availability of informal care -also mothers' labor supply.
Since both reforms were introduced simultaneously, we base our evaluation on a structural model of mothers' labor supply and child care choices. This approach allows us not only to evaluate the overall impact of both policy reforms but also to disentangle the effects of the two reforms. To this end we simulate counterfactual scenarios where only one of the two measures is introduced at a time. We exploit a comprehensive data set constructed from the German Socio-Ecomomic Panel (SOEP) and the relatively new "Familien in Deutschland"
(FID). Besides providing a viable sample for the group targeted by the reforms, the FID contains information on access restrictions to public childcare that is crucial for the child care choice which is part of our empirical model and had previously not been available (Wrohlich, 2011) .
We find that the joint introduction of the legal claim to formal child care and the 'Betreuungsgeld' has a very small positive effect on the labor supply of mothers with children in the targeted age group with their participation rate increasing by 0.4 percentage points. The use of part-time formal care also rises by 0.5 percentage points. Separate simulations of the two scenarios introducing each reform at a time show that the relatively small overall increase in labor supply can be explained by two effects going in opposite directions. The sole introduction of the legal claim to formal child care would increase mothers' labor supply by 1.3 percentage points. This is largely off-set by the introduction of the 'Betreuungsgeld' that diminishes labor supply by 0.9 percentage points.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: After providing some details on the two reforms we discuss the structural model in section 3. We describe the data set in Section 4
and present the empirical results in section 5. The final section concludes.
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2 Institutional details
Child care reforms
West Germany has long been known for its very low availability of formal child care for children below the age of three. 5 In 2002 there were 2 slots available for 100 children in this age group (Table 1 ). The situation was markedly different in East Germany where child care has been provided for more than a third of all children belonging to this age group. Several laws have been passed that aimed at increasing the supply of publicly subsidized child care for children below three years since 2005. 6 The availability of child care for children in this age group has successively increased in the following years and reached 24 percent in West and 52 percent in East Germany in 2013. A legal claim to a subsidized child care slot was introduced for all children after their first birthday in August 2013. This claim is not conditional on income or employment status of their parents.
As Wrohlich (2008) has shown for data from 2002, there has been considerable excess demand with respect to subsidized child care for children under three years in East and West
Germany. 24 percent of children in West and 59 percent of children in East Germany were rationed with respect to formal child care in 2002. Note that these numbers are not observed, but derived from the estimated parameters of a partial observability model. Information on the incidence of rationing with respect to child care was not directly available. Since 2010 a new data set 'Familien in Deutschland' (FID) is available that provides explicit information on access restrictions to formal child care. 7 According to these data the share of families with children who are rationed with respect to formal child care was considerably lower in 2010 amounting to 16 percent in West and 14 percent in East Germany. Since data from the FID are not yet available for the year 2013, we do not know whether the legal claim to child care introduced in August 2013 actually eliminated rationing with respect to formal child care for all children in their second and third year of life. However, since there is no information or public debate about a noticeable fraction of parents suing their local communities for not providing a child care slot; the current supply of child care slots apparently satisfies the demand.
Few studies have investigated the causal effect of the availability of child care on mothers' employment. Wrohlich (2011) has analyzed the introduction of a legal claim to child care for all children up to the age of three years conditional on both parents being employed using a structural model. Bauernschuster and Schlotter (2013) use the introduction of a legal claim to child care for children aged three years in 1996 as a quasi-experiment. They show that the availability of child care for children aged 3-6 years had large effects on mothers' employment in the 1990s.
'Betreuungsgeld'
On the same day the legal claim to child care for children aged 1 year came into effect, the socalled 'Betreuungsgeld' was introduced. This benefit is paid to parents of children in their second and third year of life and amounts to 100 € per month (150 € per month as of August 6 2014). It is not conditional on the parents' income or employment status. The only prerequisite is that the child is not attending any form of public or publicly subsidized child care.
A similar benefit had been introduced in the federal state of Thuringia already in 2006
('Thüringisches Landesbetreuungsgeld'). This benefit was more generous as far as the monthly amount was concerned. It was, however, only paid for one year, namely to families of children in the third year of their life. If these children were not attending public or publicly subsidized child care, their families would get a monthly benefit of 150 €. Were they attending part-time care, they would still get 75 €. 8 In addition, there was a sibling supplement of 50 € per sibling. The effects of this benefit have been evaluated in several studies (e.g. Beninger et al., 2010 , Gathmann and Sass, 2012 , Müller et al., 2013 that all point to a negative effect on mothers' labor force participation.
3 A structural model of mother's labor supply and child care choices
The mother's maximization problem
In order to evaluate the effects of the legal claim to a child care slot and the 'Betreuungsgeld', we need to model mothers' labor supply and child care choices simultaneously. 9 Although these are two separate decisions (we observe a large share of mothers with children attending child care are not working; see, e.g., Table 4 below), they are obviously linked. Since we observe that children of working mothers are not always attending formal child care, the model also needs to take informal child care options into account. Our data set does not contain information on the access to informal care, but only on the actual use of such informal care. We therefore have to 7 rely on several assumptions concerning the families' access to informal child care (sub-section 3.2). The model also needs to take into account that in the year 2010 (the reference year of our data set) there was still considerable excess demand for subsidized child care. Access restrictions to formal child care are therefore modeled explicitly in our framework.
The model presented here closely follows the approach developed in Wrohlich (2011) .
Besides a newer and broader data source (section 4), there are two important differences to note:
First, the data set that we use here provides direct information on the excess demand for public child care slots. We exploit this information and do not have to impute the rationing probability for each child from a supply/demand model. Second, in this paper we model the demand for child care for up to three children in each family separately. Wrohlich (2011) only considers the demand for child care for the youngest child in each family. This extension is important, as we want to analyze the effects of the two child care policies on child care choices not only for those children immediately targeted by the reforms but also for their siblings.
The model is based on the assumption that the mother maximizes a utility function (u) 10 in the arguments of disposable income (Y DISP ), leisure (l), the overall "quality" of her children (operationalized as sum of the "quality" for each child c: = ∑ ) and socio-demographic characteristics (D):
Leisure time in this model is interpreted as time that is neither spent with market work nor child care. The "quality" of each child c in the family depends on the child care arrangement, that means hours of formal care (f) and hours of informal care (inf):
Note that formal care here is used synonymously to paid care (formal institutional-based child care as well as paid private child care arrangements, e.g. nannies). It is thus assumed that all forms of paid child care influence the mothers' utility in the same way. For simplification, we only consider mothers with one, two or three children in the empirical estimation of the model. We follow Wrohlich (2011) and use the concept of "expected costs of child care" since it allows us to model access restrictions to subsidized child care through the budget constraint.
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We assume that rationing only occurs with respect to subsidized child care. Child care on the "private market", i.e. child care by nannies or babysitters, is not restricted. Each family is able to find a person who looks after the children, although at a (potentially quite high) price. We thus calculate "expected costs of child care" as weighted average of parents' fees to subsidized slots and the price of privately organized care. The weights reflect the probability of being restricted with respect to subsidized child care:
Expected costs of care per child ec 12 consist of the parents' fee for a subsidized child care slot c s and a market (non-subsidized) price for child care charged by a nanny c ns , weighted by the probability to get a child care slot π and 1-π, respectively (for details see Appendix A 1).
The time constraints of the mother and each child c depend on whether they have access to informal, unpaid care arrangements or not. For mothers and children who do have access to unpaid care arrangements, total time T can be written as:
This equation states that a mother can allocate her time to three activities consisting of market work h, maternal child care m and pure leisure l. A child has to be cared for over the whole day.
11 Only few international studies on labor supply and child care take access restrictions to formal child care into account. In a study for Norway, Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) restrict the choice set of families who report to be rationed with respect to formal child care. Lokshin (2004) models access restrictions to formal child care in Russia in a similar way. This implies that for families who report to be restricted, the option of paid child care is not available at all. Similarly, Del Boca and Vuri (2007) in a study on Italy restrict the choice set of families according to a simulated probability that families are restricted in the access to center-based child care. 12 The subscript c is omitted for convenience.
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Hours of maternal care m, formal care f and informal care inf must therefore add up to the total time per week available T. Since we consider families with up to three children who might be in different care arrangements (see sub-section 3.2 below), this has to be taken into account in the time budget of mothers. How the remaining time can be allocated is determined by the child c with the smallest amount of formal care (denoted by min(f c ), i.e. the minimum out of the set of f for all children). We assume that informal care does not exceed working hours of the mother; in other words, informal care is the residual in the case that working hours of the mother exceed the smallest hours of paid care for all children in the household:
From equations (5) and (6), it follows that the mother's pure leisure only takes on positive values in the case that the minimum of formal child care hours among all children in the household exceeds the mother's hours of market work (min(f c ) > h) For mothers and their children without access to informal care opportunities, the time constraint from equation (5) changes to:
The time constraint of the mother is the same as in the unrestricted case. The time of the child, however, can now only be spent with the mother (m) or in formal, i.e. paid child care (f). From this, it follows that the mother's market work and leisure together cannot exceed the hours that the youngest child spends in formal child care (min(f c )).
The Mother's Choice Set
The choice set for mothers in our model results from all available combinations of working hours categories and different child care arrangements for up to three children in a family. Modeling labor supply and child care choices jointly reflects the inherent link between those decisions: a mother can only choose to work when her child is either in formal or informal care. The detailed treatment of child care options for each child allows capturing heterogeneity in parents'
decisions with respect to age and other characteristics of the child. Just looking at the youngest child might not be representative for the behavior of a family. We consider decisions on child care arrangements for up to the three children below the age of 12. Households with more than three children are excluded from the sample as the number of observations is small relative to the large choice set for those cases.
The number of choice categories depends thus on the number of children. The choice set for a mother of a family with one child consists of 12 alternatives ( Table 2) .
The model does not rely on a fixed relation of the mother's working time and formal child care. This is important given that by far not all children of employed women are in formal child care. On the other hand, non-employed mothers may nevertheless opt for formal child care
as descriptive evidence has shown. Although the decision is modeled jointly, no particular pattern is assumed a priori, but preferences are freely estimated.
Not every mother has the option of informal care at her disposal, though. We use the question in the data whether in addition to formal care arrangements other persons outside of the household (grandparents, friends) take the responsibility of caring for the children on a regular basis. This serves as a proxy for the accessibility of informal care. In addition, we assume that children aged 7-12 have in general access to informal care. These older children can in principle care for themselves. For the remaining households informal care is not available. On the other hand, we also observe mothers who state not to use informal care but whose working hours are larger than the hours of formal child care for at least one child. We exclude those observations from the sample because we have no information on how these children spend their time while their mother is at work. Doing so, we lose about 5 per cent of our observations. For the remaining mothers the number of choice categories depends on whether informal care is available or not. For the latter case categories 2, 3, 4 and 8 (shaded in grey in Table 2 ) cannot be chosen. Mothers with a restricted choice set have only 8 instead of 12 categories at their disposal.
Extending the set of possible alternatives in Table 2 with care categories for a second child without making further assumptions would result in a choice set of 36 alternatives. This specification would allow any possible combination of care arrangements for the younger and the older child. A further extension on the basis of three children would yield a choice set of 108 possibilities (not shown). To reduce the complexity and to avoid a large number of never actually chosen categories we make additional assumptions that a priori limit the flexibility of the mother's choice, but drastically reduce the number of available alternatives. The key assumption here is that the youngest child determines the minimum amount of formal care for all children in the family.
14 Due to these restrictions the choice set for families with two children is limited to 24, for families with three children to 40 categories (Tables 21 and 22 in Appendix A 2).
Similar to one-child families the total number of alternatives in the choice sets of families with multiple children depends on the availability of informal care. These alternatives are also marked grey in the tables. For households that do not have access to informal care the size of the choice set is reduced from 24 to 13 alternatives and from 40 to 19 alternatives in families with two and three children, respectively. Both types of households are used for the estimation of the empirical discrete choice model.
Econometric Specification
The parameters of the utility function are estimated using a discrete choice model (Aaberge et al., 1995; van Soest, 1995) . Estimation is based on the mothers' utility comparisons of the different choice categories in each period. We assume that the terms of the "child quality" function linearly enter the utility function. The utility function is assumed to have a linearquadratic form. Thus, the utility index U of mother i for a particular working/child care category k can be stated as follows: ).The components of X ik are disposable household income, the mother's leisure time, hours of formal and informal child care, which all vary by household (i) and choice category (k). ε ik is an unobserved error term that is assumed to follow an extreme value distribution and to be independently distributed over households and choice categories.
Matrix A contains the coefficients of the quadratic terms and cross terms. Vector β contains the coefficients of the linear terms. Preferences are allowed to vary across mothers through taste shifters of the linear terms of mother's leisure and formal child care. We include sociodemographic characteristics such as age of the mother, living in East Germany, single mother,
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German nationality as well as the age of the youngest child being 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-6 or 7-12 years old as taste shifters.
The model is estimated separately for households with one, two, and three children.
These three models are based on three different choice sets as the number of child care choices depends on the number of children resulting in more available combinations overall (see subsection 3.2 above). We thus allow for preference heterogeneity among those different family types. There are no model restrictions as far as the signs of the coefficients for income, leisure or the different care choices are concerned.
Data
We construct a sample up of two data-sets, the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and "Familien in Deutschland" (FID), for the year 2010. In addition to the individual and household information needed to estimate the labor supply of mothers, this data set is unique for two main reasons: First, direct questions are asked in the FID related to access restrictions to public or subsidized child care slots. We are thus able to utilize information on the excess demand for public child care from the data. Second, the size of the combined data set produces a reliable sample size for the target group of the family policy reforms of interest.
The SOEP is a representative longitudinal household study that started in 1984 and contains information on roughly 20 000 individuals living in 12 000 households in the year 2010 (Wagner et al., 2007) . The relatively new FID data set is an important extension of the microdata on families available in Germany (Schröder et al., 2013) . From 2010 on, about 4 000 families with children born in the years 2007-2010 have been interviewed every year. Moreover, there is a subsample on the population of lone mothers, low-income families and families with three or more children. In terms of information and data structure it is very similar and comparable to the SOEP. In particular, the samples from the two data sources can be pooled using integrated weighting factors for SOEP and FID. Adding the FID actually more than triples the sample size of families with children up to age 12 as compared to the SOEP resulting in an estimation sample of 4, 415 households (Table 3) . Note that for the empirical results presented in section 5, i.e. the elasticities of labor supply and child care utilization as well as the policy simulations, we restrict the sample to the group of households that is directly affected by the introduction of the legal claim and the 'Betreuungsgeld'. This group consists of families with at least one child between the age of one and three years and is smaller than the estimation sample. The FiD provides a substantial amount of additional observations to guarantee reliable and representative findings for this sub-group of the population (Table 3) .
Sample Characteristics
We estimate the model on the sample of all families with at least one and at most three children.
The amount of leisure and the time spent in formal care is interacted with the age of the youngest child. As mentioned we are primarily interested in the effect on mothers with children aged between one and three years in the policy simulations as the reforms considered are targeted on this age bracket. The behavioral effects will also affect younger or older siblings in families with multiple children. Moreover, using a broader sample provides additional variation which helps for the identification of the structural parameters of interest.
All families with one child under the age of 12, about 26 percent of mothers are not working and the child is not attending formal or informal child care (Table 4) . About 17 percent of mothers are working, but only using informal child care arrangements for their children. 10 percent of mothers are working and using formal as well as informal care arrangements. On the other hand, 8 percent of mothers use formal child care for their child although they are not working. The distribution across choice categories for families with two and three children are shown in Tables 23 and 24 in the Appendix A 2. 
Disposable Household Income
Disposable household income, as described in section 3, is the difference between net household income and expected costs of child care. The calculation of this child care costs measure is explained in detail in Appendix A 1. Net household income that depends on the mother's working hours, her gross wage rate and other household income is calculated for the actual choice category and simulated for all alternative choice categories using the tax-transfer micro-simulation model STSM. 15 This tax-benefit model contains the main features of the German tax and transfer system. The calculation of taxable income is based on information on earnings from dependent employment, income from capital, property rents and other income. For most families, earnings from dependent employment are the most important source of income. The mother's earnings are calculated by multiplying gross hourly wages by the respective working hours in each category, while the father's earnings are taken as exogenous.
For non-working mothers gross wages cannot be observed. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate their expected gross hourly wage. We estimate a Mincer-type wage equation controlling for sample selection, whereby we use non-labor income, health indicators and the presence of young children as exclusion restrictions. The wage estimations are performed separately for East and West Germany (Table 26 in Appendix A 3).
Empirical Results

Estimation Results and Elasticities
The parameter estimates cannot be directly interpreted due to the nonlinear nature of the structural model and the various interaction terms in our specification (Table 27 in Appendix A 4). The consistency of the model in terms of the underlying economic interpretation relies first on positive partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to income. This condition is fulfilled for virtually all observations in the different estimations for families with one, two and three children. The second condition refers to the second order derivative of income which has to be negative (van Soest, 1995) ; this is also satisfied in our application.
Due to the nonlinearities and the interaction terms in our specification behavioral implications cannot be derived directly from the various models estimates. In order to analyze the predictions of the models in terms of the mothers' reactions to financial incentives related to their labor supply or child care choices, we calculate labor supply elasticities as well as 15 For a detailed description of the microsimulation model STSM, see Steiner et al. (2012) .
elasticities with respect to the demand for formal child care. The labor supply elasticities are obtained by simulating a one percent increase in the mother's hourly wage rate. We find that in this case, mothers on average increase their participation rate by 0.1 percentage points and their average working hours by 0.5 percent (Table 5) . These results are in line with previous findings of the literature (Bargain et al, 2014) . Likewise we simulate labor supply elasticities with respect to the costs of formal child care. For an increase of child care costs by 1 percent, the change in the mothers' labor force participation rate is found to be virtually zero for all groups (Table 6 ). On average, mothers would reduce their working hours by about 0.1 percent. 
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Labor supply is not the only margin of adjustment within our model. Mothers can also react with respect to their child care choices, when wages or child care costs change. On average, the use of formal child care increases by 0.04 percentage points, if the mother's wage is increased by 1 percent ( Table 7) . The share of children in informal care arrangements increases on average by 0.05 percentage points.
The behavioral changes in case that child care costs increase by 1 percent are of similar magnitude -albeit in the different direction -as in case of a 1 percent increases in the mother's wage (Table 8) . We find the largest reaction for mothers with children aged 1-3 years: If child care costs increase by 1 percent, the use of formal child care of children in this age group decreases by 0.06 percentage points. However, informal care arrangements increase only slightly, if at all. As far as the in-sample fit is concerned, the model performs reasonably well in predicting most choice categories (Table 4 in section 4 for mothers with 1 child, Table 23 in the Appendix A 1 for mothers with 2, and Table 24 in Appendix A 1 for mothers with 3 children). We predict, for 20 example, that 21 percent of mothers with 1 child choose no participation, no formal and no informal care; the observed share in our sample is 26 percent. The share of mothers working fulltime and using full-time child care is 21 percent in the data and 19 percent predicted by our model. We are, on the other hand, under-predicting the share of mothers with marginal employment using informal care (9 percent observed versus 5 percent predicted), while we overpredict the share of mothers working full-time and using full-time informal care (1 percent observed versus 4 percent predicted).
Policy Simulations
In order to evaluate the effect of the legal claim to a child care slot as well as the 'Betreuungsgeld' we investigate three scenarios: First, we simulate the introduction of the legal claim to a child care slot for all children who are one year or older without the simultaneous introduction of the 'Betreuungsgeld'. For this simulation, we assume that the expected costs of child care are equal to the parents' fees to subsidized slots for all families with children above the age of 1 since the rationing probability is set to zero (see Appendix A 1). As a result household income in choice categories with part-time and full-time care increases, whereas income in all other choice categories stays constant. For families with one child, the average increase in categories with part-time care is about 110 € per month and about 190 € per month in categories with full-time care. In a second simulation, we introduce the 'Betreuungsgeld' amounting to 100 € per month for each child aged 1 or 2 years. This benefit is only added to disposable household income in choice categories where no formal child care is used for children in this age group and only for families who are not receiving any other social transfers. Finally, we simulate the introduction of both reforms at the same time. Note that all three scenarios are simulated for data and legislation of the year 2010. This has to be kept in mind for the interpretation of the results: In all simulations both reforms (separately or jointly, depending on the scenario) are introduced already in 2010.
If only the legal claim to child care had been introduced, we find that mothers with children in the targeted age group would have increased their labor force participation rate by more than 1 percentage point; their average working hours would have increased by almost 6 21 percent (Table 10 , first two columns). Mothers with children aged 1 would react slightly more to this policy than mothers with children aged 2 because the labor force participation and working hours in the latter group are already higher (Table 9 ). If we differentiate mothers by education level, we find that mothers with low education react more strongly to the introduction of the legal claim (increase in participation rate by almost 2 percentage points) than mothers with higher education (increase in participation rate by 1 percentage point). Again, mothers with low education are more responsive as they have lower participation rates (44 percent) compared to mothers with higher education (51 percent). Moreover, low-educated mothers were facing more access restrictions to formal child care, as our estimations of rationing probabilities have shown (Table 17 in Appendix A 1). We similarly find that the response to the reform is smaller for households with higher overall income: the participation rate increases by 1.5 percentage points for mothers in the lowest quartile versus 0.6 percentage points for mothers in the highest quartile (Table 10 ). These differences can be attributed to lower participation rates of the lower-income mothers before the introduction of the reforms (Table 9) . As expected, negative labor supply effects, result from the simulation scenario of the isolated introduction of the 'Betreuungsgeld'. The decrease in mothers' labor supply that is a bit smaller in magnitude than the positive effect of the legal claim to child care. Mothers whose youngest child is in the targeted age group would decrease their labor force participation rate by 0.9 percentage points and their working hours by almost 3 percent (Table 10 , columns 3 and 4). We do not find that the effects differ significantly by education level of the mothers or by nationality.
However, mothers living in households with very low incomes (first quartile of the income distribution) have a much lower response to the introduction of the 'Betreuungsgeld' than mothers living in households with middle or high incomes because the subsidy is withdrawn when families receive other social transfers. This explanation is supported by an additional simulation of a hypothetical scenario where we assume that recipients of other social transfers are additionally granted the 'Betreuungsgeld' (not shown in Table) . We find that mothers in families in the bottom quartile of the income distribution decrease their participation rate by 1.6 percentage points instead of 0.4 percentage points in the scenario shown above.
In the simulation that reflects the actual reform from August 2013 where both policies are introduced simultaneously, the overall effect on mothers' labor supply is still positive, albeit much smaller than the effect of the isolated introduction of the legal claim to child care and no longer statistically significant. Mothers with children in the targeted age group would increase their labor force participation rate by 0.4 percent and their working hours by 2.5 percent in this scenario (Table 10 , last two columns). The labor supply effect for mothers with low education still amounts to an increase in the participation rate of about one percentage point. For high educated mothers, however, the joint effect of both reforms is zero. The differentiatiation by household income reveals that mothers significantly increase their labor supply in the lowest quartile, whereas mothers at the top of the income distribution work significantly less overall.
For this group the negative effect of the 'Betreuungsgeld' dominates the positive effect of the introduction of the legal claim to child care. Mothers in households at the top of the income distribution have higher participation rates before the reform and are on average less affected by access restrictions to public childcare. For these reasons they are less responsive to the legal claim, yet significantly affected by the 'Betreuungsgeld' which is not withdrawn for high income families.
These different reform scenarios also affect the decisions on childrens' care arrangements. If only the legal claim had been introduced, the share of children aged 1 or 2 years attending formal child care would have increased by about 2 percentage points, while the share of children in informal care arrangements would have decreased by roughly 0.6 percentage points (Table 11 ). In this scenario not only the child care arrangements of those children directly affected by the reform change, but also the choice of child care for their older siblings: The share of children aged 3-6 years (who have siblings aged 1 or 2) attending formal care would have increased by 1.4 percentage points. The share of primary school age children (7-12 years) attending afternoon care would have increased even by 1.8 percentage points. As far as the heterogeneity of effects according to the mother's education is concerned, we find a similar pattern in the child care reaction as in the labor supply responses. Low educated mothers show the largest response. The share of children with low educated mothers attending formal child care increases by almost 3 percentage points, whereas this share among the children with high educated mothers increases by less than 2 percentage points. Again, these differences can be explained by the fact that children with high educated mothers already had much higher 24 participation rates in formal care before the introduction of the legal claim. Moreover, rationing was less severe for this group than for lower-educated mothers before the introduction of the legal claim (Tables 17 and 18 in Appendix A 1). In contrast, the introduction of the 'Betreuungsgeld' -without the legal claim to child care coming into effect at the same time -has a negative impact on the use of formal child care. The share of children attending formal care in the targeted age group would significantly decrease by 1.5 percentage points (Table 12) . Older children with younger siblings eligible for the 'Betreuungsgeld' would also be attending formal child care to a lower extent (-1.2 percentage points). We do not find large differences in the response to the 'Betreuungsgeld' for children with mothers of different educational backgrounds. There are noticeable differences by household income, though. As mentioned the 'Betreuungsgeld' is not available for families with lower incomes that receive other social benefits. Their behavioral response is thus much smaller as we could see with the labor supply effects. In a hypothetical simulation scenario where we assume that the 'Betreuungsgeld' can be drawn in addition to other social benefits, the effects for children from households in the 1st quartile amounts to -2.3 percentage points (not shown) whereas in the scenario where this benefit withdrawn should the family receive social transfers, the effect for this group is only -0.65 percentage points (Table 12) . In the simulation scenario where both reforms are introduced at the same time the overall effect of the use of formal child care for children in the targeted age group is still positive and weakly significant amounting to 0.5 percentage points (Table 13 ). Compared to the sole introduction of the legal claim to child care it is reduced significantly. The increase in the share of children with low educated mothers attending formal child care would still be relatively large (+ 1.4 percentage points). Children from families with incomes in the upper half of the income distribution, however, would attend formal care even to a significantly lesser extent than without the introduction of the two reforms. Similar to the negative labor supply effects of this group and for the same reasons (relatively larger participation rates and lower access restrictions), the negative effect of the 'Betreuungsgeld' dominates the positive effect of the legal claim to child care. 
Conclusions
Since 2006 several family policy reforms have been implemented in Germany. A principal goal inherent in most of those new policies is to reduce family-related employment interruptions for mothers. The expansion of public or publicly subsidized child care is an important component of this strategy. The legal claim to a publicly subsidized child care slot for children aged after the first birthday which became effective in August 2013 is the latest step in this direction. At exactly the same time, however, a new benefit, the so-called 'Betreuungsgeld' was introduced that counteracts improvements in labor supply and child care incentives, since it is only granted to families whose children do not attend publicly subsidized formal child care. It also targets all children aged one year or older. Both reforms are unconditional on the parents' income or employment status. A breakdown of the effects by socio-economic subgroups illustrated that for mothers with low education and from low income families the overall effects with respect to labor supply and the utilization of public child care are more positive. These groups are more responsive to the legal claim because they had smaller participation rates before the reform and access restrictions were particularly severe for them. Moreover, 'Betreuungsgeld' cannot be drawn in addition to other social benefits. Negative incentives to work and to send the children to formal child care are thus not effective for families who receive other social benefits. The positive impact by the legal claim is therefore to a lower extent offset by the 'Betreuungsgeld' compared to high educated mothers or mothers from high-income families.
We conclude that the simultaneous introduction of the 'Betreuungsgeld' almost counteracts the positive effects the legal claim to child care has on mothers' employment and 28 children's child care attendance. The 'Betreuungsgeld' has been primarily motivated by distributional arguments in the political sphere: families (mostly mothers) who are not inclined to use public or publicly subsidized child care should also be rewarded for the care work they provide at home or organize in private settings. On the other hand, such a benefit clearly implies strong disincentives to work for mothers with children aged 1 to 3 years. This holds in particular for mothers in families with medium or higher incomes. It thus weakens previous reforms efforts which were deliberately aimed at reducing the employment interruptions of mothers. However, the conjecture that disadvantaged families would react most strongly to the 'Betreuungsgeld' by having the largest negative labor supply responses and reductions in formal child care cannot be confirmed, as our results for different socio-economic subgroups show. On the contrary, since low-income families often receive other social transfers, they do not (fully) benefit from the 'Betreuungsgeld'. We rather find the largest negative responses among higher-income families.
Appendix
A 1 Calculation of the expected costs of child care
Following Wrohlich (2011) we argue that since there has still been excess demand for subsidized child care facilities in Germany in the year 2010, we have to calculate a measure of child care
costs that takes rationing explicitly into account. Parents' fees to subsidized child care facilities are relatively low in Germany. However, access to these slots has been rationed in many regions.
Families who do not have access to subsidized child care have to rely on the private market of nannies or babysitters, which comes at considerably higher costs. We therefore define the expected costs of child care (ec) for each child to consist of the parents' fee for a subsidized child care slot c s and a market (non-subsidized) price for child care charged by a nanny c ns , weighted
by the probability to get a child care slot π and 1-π, respectively:
For the calculation of the expected costs of child care we need three components: the parents' fees to a subsidized slot (c s ), the costs for child care organized in private arrangements (c ns ), and the probability that a child has access to a slot in a subsidized facility (π).
Calculation of parents' fess (c s )
Unfortunately, information on parents' fees is not available in the SOEP for the year 2010.
Information thereon is, however, available in the FID data set. We therefore estimate parents' fees to part-time and full-time care based on information about the age of the child, household income, federal state, family status of the mother and number of siblings. Based on this model, we impute average parents' fees for all families in the SOEP and also for FID families who are currently not using formal child care. Table 14 shows descriptive statistics of the sample that we use for the estimation of parents' fees. Notes: North Rhine-Westphalia is the reference category among the dummies for federal states. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Source: FiD 2010; own calculations.
We estimated three separate regression models, one for part-time care for children aged 0-6 years, one for full-time care for children of the same age group and one for parents' fees for afternoon care for children aged 6-12 years. We use Tobit models for the estimation of parents' fees since a relatively large share of parents does not have to pay for child care services (Table   15) .
Costs for private care arrangements (c ns )
Similarly to parents' fees we observe the costs for private care arrangements only for families who use this kind of care. These costs need to be imputed for all other families. Information on costs for private child care arrangements (nannies or babysitters) is also available only in the FID data set. Here we have information on the monthly expenses for this child care arrangement and the hours of private care per week. Since we want to calculate hourly costs, the latter information is important.
Unfortunately, information on monthly expenses and hours of care per week for private care arrangements only exist for 31 children in the FID data set. Due to this very limited number of observations it is not reasonable to estimate an econometric model. We therefore choose to impute the average of the hourly costs of those 31 children (which is 6.4 Euro per hour) and assume that all families have access to this sort of care arrangement at this price.
Rationing probability (1-π)
The FID is the first data set in which parents whose children are not attending formal child care are explicitly asked for the reasons. Among other reasons, parents can tick the following answers (more than one option possible):
-"Because I did not get a slot"
-"Because the distance is too far"
-"Because the opening hours do not fit my needs"
If parents tick one of these three reasons for why their children are not attending formal child care, we can interpret this as rationing. Based on this interpretation we set the probability that a child is rationed (1-π) to 1 for all children for whom parents tick one of these options. For all other children (i.e. for children, who are attending formal child care as well as for children who are not attending, whose parents however tick other reasons for this) we set this probability to 0. Table 16 gives an overview on the incidence of formal care attendance and rationing for children in different age groups and regions. Parents are not asked for the reasons that their children are not attending formal child care in the SOEP. The probability (1-π) is thus not directly available for these children. Therefore we estimate the rationing probability depending on age of the child, age, education and employment history of the mother, number and age of siblings as well as regional characteristics in order to impute the rationing probability for all children in our data set. Table 17 shows the estimation results from a probit model of the probability of being rationed for children aged 0-6 years. Table 18 presents the results for children aged 7-12 years.
Based on these models, we predict rationing probabilities for all children in the SOEP and FID data set. Average rationing probabilities by age group and region are reported in Table 19 . Based on this model we find, for example, that 19 percent of one year old and 14 percent of two year old children are rationed with respect to formal child care. Notes: North Rhine-Westphalia is the reference category among the dummies for federal states. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Source: FiD 2010; own calculations. Notes: North Rhine-Westphalia is the reference category among the dummies for federal states. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Source: FiD 2010; own calculations. 
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Calculation of the expected costs of child care
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A 2 Additional Tables on the Choice Set for Families with 2 and 3 children
A 3 Wage Estimation
The wage estimations are based on pooled SOEP and FiD data for the years 1999-2009. The sample includes all persons aged 18 to 65 years. Estimations were performed separately for men and women and people in East and West Germany. Using a two-step Heckit model we take the selection into employment into account.
Since there are no observed hourly wages in the SOEP and the FiD, we calculate hourly wages for dependently employed on the basis of the monthly gross income and the monthly working time that are raised in these surveys. We include information on paid and unpaid overtime in order to bring paid working time in line with paid working hours and calculate a precise hourly wage.
Variable definitions are given in Table 25 ; Table 26 documents the coefficients from the selection and wage equations for the four different estimation samples: men in East, women in East, men in West, and women in West Germany. Number of years in full time employment, squared and divided by 100 teilz Number of years in part time employment teilz2
Number of years in part time employment, squared and divided by 100 exp Number of years in time employment (part and full time) exp2
Number of years in time employment (part and full time), squared and divided by 100 ten Job tenure in years ten2
Job tenure in years, squared and divided by 100 hkabbau "Depriciation of human capital": years of being not in employment nor apprenticeship in the last 10 years, i.e. years of unemployment or out of the labor force erwm Degree of disability erwm2
Degree of disability squared and divided by 100 ehe Dummy: married child1
Number of children aged < 3 years in household child2
Number of children aged 3-6 years in household child3
Number of children aged 6-16 years in household child4
Number 
